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Special 301 and Access to Medicine in the Obama Administration1
by Sean M. Flynn2
I. Introduction
This article examines the history and current use
of the Special 301 program to restrict access to generic
medicines in developing countries, specifically the
2009 and 2010 reports released under the Obama
Administration. The news for access to medicines
advocates is not good overall. Both reports continue
the previous Administration’s policies of using Special
301 to promote Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) policies (“TRIPS-plus”)
endangering access to medicines for millions of
people worldwide. These policies violate not only the
Obama Administration’s pledges to promote access
to affordable medications in developing countries,
but also U.S. commitments under the 2001 World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, numerous
World Health Organization resolutions, and express
Congressional policy. Although the reports reflect
small moves toward a more complete embrace of the
Doha Declaration and a de-escalation of some issues
threatening access to medicines, the most recent Special
301 Reports signal more continuity than change in
U.S. policy on trade and access to medicines.
1 2

II. Legal and Statutory Background
The Special 301 program takes its name from, and
builds upon the administrative structure of, Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (“Act”). That Act was
passed at a time of large and growing trade deficits,
increasing flight of manufacturing activities abroad,
skyrocketing foreign debt, and economic crisis caused
by dependency on foreign oil imports, all of which
fueled a mood in U.S. policy circles that was decidedly
“protectionist.”3 U.S. export industries attached
1. This is an abbreviated version of a forthcoming article to be
published in the next issue of the Journal on Generic Medicine.
Special thanks are due to Prudence Cho for her stellar editing
assistance. Remaining errors are mine.
2. Associate Director, Program on Information Justice and
Intellectual Property, American University Washington College of
Law. Harvard Law School (magna cum laude) ’99, Pitzer College
(Honors) ’92.
3. Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information
Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? 85 (2003).

considerable blame on the weak enforcement regimes in
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),
and the accompanying inability of the U.S. to enforce
free trade commitments abroad.4 Section 301 was a
key element of the response.
Section 301 authorizes the President to impose
economic sanctions on countries that “burden or
restrict United States commerce.”5 Notably, the law
does not require that the alleged conduct violate any
trade agreement with the U.S. to be subject to sanction
under the Act.6
At the urging of the pharmaceutical and copyright
industries, Section 301 was amended in 1984 and 1988
to expand the policy into intellectual property. The
1984 amendment established “adequate and effective
protection of intellectual property rights” as grounds
for 301 investigation and sanctions. In 1988, the
statute was amended again to create the new intellectual
property-focused “Special 301” program.
Under Special 301, the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) is required to annually
publish in the Federal Register a list of countries that
“deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual
property” or “deny fair and equitable market access for
U.S. firms that rely on intellectual property,” and then
designate among those countries the subset of worst
actors to be designated “priority foreign countries.”7
These requirements resulted in USTR’s creation of a
“Watch List” and “Priority Watch List,” which serve
4. See generally Aggressive Unilateralism 18-26 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990); Drahos & Brathwaite,
supra note 3; Andreas f. Lowenfeld, International Economic
Law 46 (1st ed. 2002) (discussing weak GATT enforcement rules);
Susan Sell, Private power, Public Law: The Globalization
of Intellectual Property Rights (2003) (discussing the general
history of the creation of the WTO).
5. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(c) (2010) (describing authorized sanctions
as including suspension of trade agreements, the imposition of
tariffs or restrictions on imported goods, and the withdrawal of
Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) benefits for developing
countries).
6. See Leslie Alan Glick, Guide to United States Customs
and Trade Laws: After The Customs Modernization Act 150
(3rd ed. 2008).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (2010) (listing identification criteria); see
also, § 2242(e) (2010) (requiring Trade Representative to publish a
list in the Federal Register).
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as warning mechanisms to countries perceived as
out of compliance with USTR’s preferences on IP
policy. Designation as a “Priority Foreign Country”
triggers a 30-day countdown during which targeted
countries must “[enter] into good faith negotiations” or
“[make] significant progress in bilateral or multilateral
negotiations” or face sanctions determinations under
the Section 301 process.8
Special 301 findings are, by intent and definition,
unilateral findings by the U.S. and subject only to
U.S. standards. As in the original Section 301, foreign
practices and policies do not have to contravene any
trade agreement with the United States to be subject to
listing on watch lists or for sanction determinations.9
Nor must the U.S. take into account a country’s level of
economic development in determining what is fair or
unfair—a sharp departure from GATT rules promoting
special and differential treatment for developing
countries.10
III. Special 301 and Access to Medicines
During the TRIPS Agreement negotiations,
concerns about its impact on access to medicines were
a primary issue for many countries. Pharmaceutical
patents grant monopoly rights to patent holders,
allowing them to charge much higher prices than
would be possible in a competitive environment. That
effect is justified by the assertion that a portion of those
excess profits would be directed toward research and
development of new medicines.
The increased prices that patents permit to
promote social benefits from research and development
also create social costs by limiting access to affordable
medications. Economists call this social cost
“deadweight loss,” and it refers the number of people
who would have been able to purchase the medicine at
a lower competitive price who are unable to purchase
the medicine at the higher monopoly price.
The deadweight loss effect is most pronounced
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(C) (2010) (specifying that “In
identifying priority foreign countries under subsection (a)(2) of this
section, the Trade Representative shall only identify those foreign
countries that are not entering into good faith negotiations, or making
significant progress in bilateral or multilateral negotiations.” (emphasis
added)).
9. See Glick, supra note 6, at150 (explaining the “great deal of
discretion” USTR has to define infringements).
10. See Hesham Youssef, Special and Differential Treatment for
Developing Countries in the WTO, (South Centre, T.R.A.D.E.
Working Papers 2, 1999), available at http://www.southcentre.
org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=283%3As
pecial-and-differential-treatment-for-developing-countries-in-thewto&Itemid=1&lang=en.
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and harmful in developing countries with high income
inequality. In such markets, the nature of demand—
with a small number of very wealthy people and a large
number of the very poor—predictably leads to profit
maximizing pricing that will exclude the great majority
from access while providing miniscule incentives for
future innovation.11
Recognizing the unbalanced costs and benefits
of intellectual property, particularly with respect to
medicines, it is commonly accepted that intellectual
property rules for medicines should differ among
countries.12 The WTO agreement on TRIPS
harmonizes global patent and other intellectual
property standards to a minimum level. But the
agreement permits a great deal of differentiation
between countries through provisions allowing
flexibility in defining rights and the exceptions
and limitations of them.13 Primary among TRIPS
flexibilities supporting access to medicines are the
freedom to grant compulsory licenses for any purpose;
freedom to define the scope of patentability through
definitions of novelty and inventiveness standards;
liberty to permit parallel importation of protected
goods from any country; permission to limit patent
terms to twenty-years without extension; absence of
any requirement to adopt U.S.-style patent-registration
“linkage” systems (where registration authorities are
required to check patent status before approving the
safety profile of a drug); a flexible requirement to
protect undisclosed data that does not require U.S. or
EU-style “data exclusivity” that grants originator firms
a limited marketing monopoly even in absence of a
patent; and complete freedom to regulate the prices
and other sales terms of any patented good, including
through price controls or completion duties.
IV. Special 301 in the Obama Administration
The cause of promoting access to affordable
11. Sean Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike Palmedo, An Economic
Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in
Developing Countries, 37 J.L. Med. & Ethics 184 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development
Policy, 155 (2002); Intellectual Property and Development, Lessons
from Recent Economic Research, 215 (Carsten Fink & Keith E.
Maskus eds., 2005); Joseph Stiglitz, Intellectual Property Rights and
Wrongs, available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
stiglitz61/English.
13. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, art. 8, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO [hereinafter TRIPS]
(expressing the overriding principles that countries remain free to
“adopt measures necessary to protect public health” and to take
measures “to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights”).
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medicines in developing countries has occasionally
become a high-profile political issue. When the Clinton
Administration pressed South Africa and Brazil to halt
the use of TRIPS flexibilities to promote affordable
AIDS medications in their public treatment programs,
U.S. AIDS activists protested at the campaign rallies of
Vice President Gore, who was running for president.
A policy change ensued, and since then Democratic
presidential candidates (more than Republicans) have
attempted to reach out to global health advocates in
their campaigns.
The Bush Administration was largely hostile
to access to medicine concerns and favorable to
the interests of the brand name pharmaceutical
industry. Special 301 was a central vehicle for the
Administration’s efforts to impose ever-higher
intellectual property standards around the world
with little regard for their effect on the affordability
of potentially life saving treatments. Special 301
was used to press countries to limit grounds for
compulsory licenses, restrict freedom to define the
scope of patentability, prohibit parallel importation,
extend patents beyond twenty years, implement
“linkage” between drug registration and assertions
of patent protection, adopt U.S. or EU-style “data
exclusivity” rules, and do away with evidencebased formularies and other price and competition
restrictions on pharmaceutical monopoly power. The
administration justified these pressures in spite of its
international commitments with the assertion that “IP
rights ultimately enhance public health . . . and that
therefore this approach is consistent with the Doha
Declaration.”14
The Obama presidential campaign recognized the
access to medicine issue as part of its campaign’s global
health platform. Obama declared that his presidency
would “break the stranglehold that a few big drug and
insurance companies have on these life-saving drugs,”
and pledged support for “the rights of sovereign nations
to access quality-assured, low-cost generic medication
to meet their pressing public health needs.”15
The Obama Administration has now produced
two Special 301 reports cataloguing its policies on
14. U.S. Gov’t accountability Office, Report to
Congressional Requesters: U.S. Trade Policy Guidance
on WTO Declaration on Access to Medicines May Need
Clarification (2007) [hereinafter GAO Access Report] (quoting
Administration officials).
15. Press Release, The Office of the President - Elect, The ObamaBiden Plan to Combat Global HIV/AIDS, http://change.gov/pages/
the_obama_biden_plan_to_combat_global_hiv_aids (Oct. 29,
2010, 12:08 EST).

intellectual property and access to medicines. With
no free trade agreements yet negotiated in its term,16
these reports are key indications of the Administration’s
accomplishments on its promises to change the
previous hostility to access to medicine concerns. As
detailed below, the Administration receives low marks
on its commitments thus far.
A. Procedural Reform
The most notable change in Special 301 under
the Obama Administration may be in the area of
procedural reform. But even here, the change has been
extremely modest.
USTR reviews the IP policies of a large number
of countries every year. The 2010 report states that
the laws and policies of seventy-seven countries were
reviewed through “extensive research and analysis.”17
USTR has few dedicated staff to this effort,18 and
lacks the necessary legal, economic, and other experts
to independently research and analyze the world’s
intellectual property policies and their economic effect
on US trade interests. The agency therefore relies largely
on an administrative comment process to provide the
factual material required.19
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America (“PhRMA”) annually submits hundreds
of pages of detailed allegations about the intellectual
property and pharmaceutical policies of countries
around the globe. PhRMA regularly targets countries
failing to enact U.S.-style intellectual property and
data protection standards or having reimbursement
formularies that consider cost or promote generic
medicines. Of the forty-eight countries PhRMA
requested to be included in watch lists in 2008, thirtysix, or 75%, of the requests were honored by USTR.
In the past, it was exceedingly rare for
16. See Staff of Special Investigations Division, U.S.
House of Representatives Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Trade
Agreements and Access to Medications Under the Bush
Administration: Prepared for Henry Waxman (2005)
[hereinafter Waxman Report] (for analysis of the impact of Bush
Administration FTAs on access to medicine concerns); Robert
Weissman, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in Trade Agreements: Consequences
for Public Health (Essential Action, Working Paper), available at
http://www.essentialaction.org/access/uploads/tripsplusprovisions.
doc.
17. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive
Office of the President, 2010 Special 301 Report, at 3 (Apr.
30, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Special 301 Report].
18. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Office of
Intellectual Property and Innovation has a total of 8 staff, as verified
over a phone inquiry on October 9, 2009.
19. Drahos & Brathwaite, supra note 3, at 94 (describing
USTR’s “symbiotic” reliance on industry submissions).
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pharmaceutical policy interests other than PhRMA
to make their voices heard in the Special 301 process.
Part of this has been by design. Reflecting a desire at
the time to increase industry input into trade policy,
the Special 301 statute requires USTR to “take into
account information from such sources . . . submitted
to the Trade Representative by interested persons.”20
Although “interested persons” may include targeted
countries or non-governmental organizations, in
practice, USTR has sought and received input almost
exclusively from industry.
If the goal of the comment period was to solicit
a full record of differing views and information to
adjudicate between them, then one would expect an
adversarial process in which notice and opportunities
to be heard would be structured for targeted countries
and their allies to respond. Yet, until 2008, the process
effectively made replies to the industry complaints
impossible, as all comments were due on the same day.
Presently, countries (but not non-state party allies)
are given two weeks of additional time to submit
comments after industry submissions are received.
That change appears to have led to a dramatic increase
of country submissions in the process, from a norm
of three or four per year to over twenty in 2009 and
2010. In 2010, for the first time, the USTR held an
open public hearing (limited to participants physically
present in the U.S.) as part of its report preparation
process. The number of submissions ballooned to over
500, nearly 90% of which were from individuals or
public interest organizations opposed to the current
direction of U.S. trade policy.21
Although the process improved in 2010, the
hearing procedure implemented by USTR remains
severely flawed from an administrative justice
standpoint. In a normal regulatory review process, a
draft regulation or report is released and comments
are requested on its contents. After the comments, the
agency is normally compelled to explain its decision
between opposing comments, thus demonstrating
that any choices between opposing views have some
rational basis. The Special 301 process lacks these basic
procedural norms. Comments are invited on a notice,
not a draft. And the final report that was issued in 2010
failed to respond to any of the factual and legal disputes
before it.

One of the hallmarks of a just and fair
administrative process is an avenue for appealing
questions of law, policy, and erroneous findings
of fact to an independent authority. Indeed, this
procedural protection is being demanded by USTR
for pharmaceutical pricing programs abroad, but is
not being given in the Special 301 process that is used
to make such demands. The Special 301 adjudication
process lacks any defined means for the appeal of legal,
policy, and factual determinations in the draft report to
an independent body.

20. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(2)(B) (2010).
21. See Submissions Concerning Special 301, www.regulation.
gov (choose “Read Comments” then enter “USTR 2010-0003” in
“Keyword or ID”).

22. Office Of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive
Office Of the President, 2002 Special 301 Report 5 (2002)
[hereinafter 2002 Special 301 Report].
23. Office Of the U.S. Trade Representative, Executive
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B. Continuation of Restrictions on Access to Medicines
The change in Special 301 procedure in the
Obama Administration has been similarly modest.
A comparison of the 2009 and 2010 Special 301
reports shows some gradual change in the direction of
promoting access to medicines and respecting the Doha
Declaration. Both reports continue to press developing
and other countries to adopt access to medicines
limiting policies in excess of those required by TRIPS
and in excess of the restrictions placed on the Bush
Administration’s negotiation of the May 2007 New
Trade Policy for America.
1. Incomplete Embrace of the Doha Declaration
The Bush Administration Special 301 reports
rhetorically embraced the Doha Declaration, while
avoiding its affirmation of the rights of countries to
use TRIPS flexibilities “to the full” or the commitment
that TRIPS “can and should” be interpreted and
implemented to promote access to medicines for
all public health problems. In the first Special 301
report after the Doha Declaration, the U.S. limited
its embrace of the Doha declaration to situations to
“address a major health crisis, like the HIV/AIDS
crisis in sub-Saharan Africa.”22 By 2008, the Bush
Administration’s stance had moderated somewhat,
recognizing the application of the Doha Declaration to
“serious public health problems.”
The Obama Administration’s statements on the
Doha Declaration are slightly broader. The 2009 report
eliminates the qualification “serious” from the public
health problems Doha was meant to address, explaining
that the “United States respects a country’s right to
protect public health, in particular, to promote access
to medicines for all.”23 For the first time, the report
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explicitly mentions support for use of compulsory
licenses.24 The same language is included in the 2010
report.25 These are much broader categories of public
interest concerns than the U.S. has previously endorsed.
But the Administration still appears intent on avoiding
the Doha Declaration’s affirming of the rights to use
TRIPS flexibilities “to the full” and the instruction
that TRIPS “can and should” be interpreted and
implemented to promote public health and access to
medicines.
2. Data Exclusivity
The most common objection in the 2009 and
2010 reports related to pharmaceutical policy is
a complaint about “lack of protection . . . against
unfair commercial use of undisclosed test and other
data.”26 In 2010, fifteen countries were cited for lack
of adequate pharmaceutical data protection (Algeria,
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Turkey, and Vietnam). This number of
citations is down from twenty one countries similarly
cited in 2009.
The vague complaints about lack of data protection
are best interpreted as a demand for a new form of
pharmaceutical marketing monopoly known as “data
exclusivity.” The issue arises because of requirements
that manufacturers must prove the safety, efficacy, and
quality of medicines through clinical trials or other
data. When a generic manufacturer subsequently
attempts to obtain marketing approval for a
therapeutically equivalent medicine, it is normally
required to prove only bioequivalence to the already
approved drug. In this way, the generic firm relies on
the original safety and efficacy data. “Data exclusivity”
rules delineate a time period in which a generic firm
may not rely on the originator’s safety and efficacy data
to approve a competing product, thus requiring that
the generic product either remain off the market or
repeat costly clinical trials.27
The TRIPS Agreement requires that certain
Office Of the President, 2009 Special 301 Report, at 6 (2009)
[hereinafter 2009 Special 301 Report].
24. Id.
25. 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 17, at 12-13.
26. 2009 Special 301 Report, supra note 23, at 17.
27. See World Medical Association (“WMA”), Declaration of
Helsinki - Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects, 18th WMA Gen. Assemb. Art. 20 (Oct. 2008); see also
WHO, The Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property (GSPOA), 61st World Health
Assemb. (2008).

pharmaceutical test data submitted to registration
authorities be protected from “unfair commercial
use.”28 Article 39.3’s literal scope is relatively narrow.29
Importantly, countries have great leeway in defining
what use or reliance on test data may be “unfair” or
“commercial.”30 A World Health Organization paper
advises that “[c]ountries are not obligated under Article
39.3 to confer exclusive rights on the originator of
marketing approval data,”31 and most traditional uses
of registration data “to assess the efficacy and toxicity
of a pharmaceutical or agrochemical product is not a
commercial use subject to Article 39.3.”32
The practice of providing a form of exclusivity for
pharmaceutical test data originates with the HatchWaxman Act in the U.S. The Act included a political
compromise by providing an avenue for generic firms
to register based on originator safety and efficacy data,
but prohibiting such reliance in the first five years after
the data is filed. In the EU, data exclusivity periods
were later enacted that can run as long as eleven years.33
These periods operate independently of any period of
patent exclusivity and in the EU have been interpreted
to be impervious to compulsory licensing, even in a
health emergency.34 Most countries in the world do not
follow exclusivity rules.35 In such countries, the only
marketing monopoly companies receive is through the
patent system rather than the registration system.36
USTR has adopted a legal interpretation of TRIPS
28. TRIPS, supra note 13, at art. 39.3.
29. Test data must be protected only if: (1) national authorities
require its submission; (2) it is undisclosed, not already public,
(as many clinical trial results in the U.S. are by virtue of state
and local clinical trial registry laws); and (3) it concerns a new
chemical entity, i.e., the undisclosed data is “the result of significant
investment,” proof which could be required.
30. See Carlos Correa, Protection of Data Submitted for the
Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing the Standards of the
Trips Agreement, South Centre/WHO (2002) at 41-47, available
at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h3009ae/h3009ae.pdf
(explaining that such a minimum provision would satisfy art. 39 of
TRIPS).
31. Id, at x.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Brook Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid—
Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 Am. J.L.
& Med. 303, 303-44 (2008).
34. Letter from Martin Teberger, Head of Unit for Consumer
Goods to the Eur, Generic Pharms. Ass’n. to Greg Perry, Eur.
Generic Med. Ass’n., (Feb. 20, 2006) (available at wcl.american.
edu/pijip/go/eu02202006).
35. Sisule F. Musungu & Cecilia Oh, The Use of TRIPS By
Developing Countries: Can they Promote Access to Medicine?, Comm’n
on Intellectual Prop. Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Study
4C, 65-67 (Aug. 2005).
36. Cf. Correa, supra note 30 at xi.
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that Article 39.3 requires data exclusivity similar to the
U.S. or EU. This interpretation is in direct conflict with
the negotiating history of the TRIPS agreement, during
which the U.S. proposal to include language in Article
39 requiring that pharmaceutical test data be “reserved
for the exclusive use of the registrant for a reasonable
period”37 was rejected and amended out of the final
text.38 Despite this rejection of a data exclusivity
requirement by TRIPS negotiators, both PhRMA and
the USTR have argued that Article 39.3 of TRIPS
requires countries to implement data exclusivity
regimes.39
Data exclusivity can have particularly harmful
effects in developing countries. In many developing
countries, drug companies lack patents because they
were never sought or granted. In such circumstances,
data exclusivity grants a marketing monopoly in the
absence of patent protection. Another problem is that
companies often register their products in developing
countries very late, focusing instead on the wealthy
markets. When this is the case, data exclusivity can
extend monopoly periods past the point at which the
medicine is subject to full competition in the U.S.40
The USTR’s use of Special 301 to push its
interpretation of Article 39.3 on developing countries
displays the inadequacy of Special 301 as a just and
neutral adjudicative process and highlights the reason
why it violates the WTO. Countries cannot have the
right to list and sanction other countries for violating
their own interpretation of the WTO accord. The
proper route for pressing TRIPS complaints is through
dispute resolution.
3. Registration and Patent Linkage
The 2010 report indicates a policy change in
the Obama Administration on the issue of linkage.
“Linkage” refers to requirements that FDA-like
marketing authorities not register generic copies of
medicines for which there is a patent claimed by a
37. See Correa, supra note 30 at 53.
38. Carlos Correa & Abdulqawi Yusuf, Intellectual
Property and International Trade: The TRIPs Agreement
(1998); Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting
History and Analysis 182-183 (1998).		
39. See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(“PhRMA”) Special 301 Submission 2009 , available at http://www.
ipophil.gov.ph/ipenforcement/phrma_submission.pdf [hereinafter
2009 PhRMA Submission].
40. See Staff of Special Investigations Division, U.S.
House of Representatives Comm. on Gov’t Reform, Trade
Agreements and Access to Medications Under the Bush
Administration: Prepared for Henry Waxman 7 (2005)
[hereinafter Waxman Report].
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supplier. This is an added enforcement process favored
by patent holders. It permits them to use patent claims
to block marketing of products without the need to
sue the alleged infringer in courts to enforce the patent
rights. The rule in the US has led to “ever-greening,”
— where marketing monopolies are extended with new
(often baseless) applications for patents that may be
used to prohibit marketing approval of generics unless
and until the generic firm successfully challenges the
patent in court.41 Evergreening problems are likely to
be more pronounced in developing countries that lack
the rigorous patent examination process and other
regulatory resources and expertise of the U.S.42 TRIPS
does not require countries to implement linkage rules.
In 2009, a lack of linkage was the second most
cited medicines-related complaint in Special 301 (after
data exclusivity). The complaint was normally framed
as an alleged failure by countries to “implement an
effective system to prevent the issuance of marketing
approvals for unauthorized copies of patented
pharmaceutical products.”43 A nearly identical
complaint was raised against twelve countries in the
2009 report.
In 2010, the number of countries cited for
lacking linkage requirements decreased to eight —
Chile, Pakistan, Columbia, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Malaysia and Mexico. Of these, Chile,
Columbia and the Dominican Republic are signatories
to free trade agreements with the U.S. that already
require linkage. The other countries have no outside
obligations to enforce linkage rules.
Perhaps more importantly, the language used to
define the complaint also shifted. Instead of requesting
a “system to prevent the issuance of marketing
approvals,” as in 2009, the 2010 report asks for “an
effective system to address patent issues expeditiously in
connection with applications to market pharmaceutical
products.”44 Such a system could be an effective court
41. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent
Expiration: An FTC Study (2002). See also Robert Weissman,
Victory and Betrayal: The Evergreen Patent System Pharmaceutical
Company Tactics to Extend Patent Protections, Multinational Monitor
(June 2002); Marc Kaufman, Drug Firms’ Deals Allowing Exclusivity
— Makers of Generics Being Paid to Drop Patent Challenges, FTC
Review Finds, The Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 2006; Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Agreements Filed with the Fed. Trade Comm’n
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003: Summary of Agreements Filed
in FY 2005, A Report by the Bureau of Competition (2006),
available at www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf.
42. Waxman Report, supra note 16, at 9.
43. 2009 Special 301 Report, supra note 23, at 30.
44. 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 17, at 30.
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adjudication process for the enforcement of patent
rights. But so interpreted, the complaint becomes
incredibly vague, leaving the reader with very little idea
as to what is in fact being complained about.
4. Restrictions on Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing is perhaps the most
important flexibility in the TRIPS agreement. Despite
the express mention of respect for the rights of
countries to issue compulsory licenses in the 2010
report, the Obama Administration is continuing to use
Special 301 to pressure countries to reduce the use of
this important tool to promote public health.
A compulsory license is a government-issued
license to one or more competitors permitting entry in
the market upon payment of adequate royalties to the
patent holder. The Doha Declaration affirms the right
of all countries to use compulsory licenses to promote
access to medicines, stating that each country “has the
right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted.”
The Obama Administration is continuing to
use Special 301 to pressure Thailand over its use of
compulsory licenses. In 2007, Thailand was elevated
to the Priority Watch List (“PWL”) in large part
for its announcement of compulsory licenses for
excessively priced medicines needed to treat AIDS
and heart disease. The official U.S. complaint was
not about the license per se, but the alleged failure of
Thai government to “engage openly and transparently
with the companies that developed the drugs that
are at issue.”45 In 2009, Thailand was kept on the
PWL, noting “the uncertainty created by the previous
Government’s policies concerning the issuance of
compulsory licenses on patented pharmaceutical
products.”46 Thailand remained on the 2010 PWL as
well. Although the words “compulsory license” were
eliminated from the entry, the issue was indicated
through a call for Thailand “to engage in a meaningful
and transparent manner with all relevant stakeholders,
including owners of intellectual property rights, as
it considers ways to address Thailand’s public health
challenges.”47

45. Letter from Ralph L. Boyce, U.S. Ambassador, to Gen.
Surayud Chulanont, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thail.,
(July 20, 2007) (available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/iphealth/2007-August/011610.html).
46. 2009 Special 301 Report, supra note 23, at 21.
47. 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 17, at 28.

5. Patent Extensions
Under TRIPS, WTO members are required to
grant patents for a period of twenty years from the
time the patent is filed. This period takes into account
the known delays in regulatory processes. But the
U.S. has long used Special 301 to pressure countries
to extend patent terms for delays in granting patents
or marketing approvals for medicines. In response to
the public health concerns with such extensions,48
the Bush Administration’s 2007 New Trade Policy
demanded that the U.S. “[e]liminate [the] requirement
that an FTA country extend the term of a patent on
a pharmaceutical product for delays in the patent
and regulatory approval process,” and instead “ensure
expeditious patent and regulatory approval.”49 In 2009
and 2010, no developing country was targeted for a
failure to grant patent extensions to compensate for
regulatory delays. But Israel was cited for lack of patent
extensions in both reports.50
6. Patentability Criteria
One of the key flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement
is the ability of a country to decide for itself what
inventions qualify for patents for being sufficiently
“new,” involving an “inventive step” and being “capable
of industrial application.”51 In pharmaceuticals, the
definition of these terms can determine whether a
country grants patents for new uses or formulations
of existing products that are already known. The grant
of such patents is controversial between countries and
among experts, and there are no provisions in TRIPS
restricting country flexibility in making these basic
policy decisions.
The 2009 and 2010 reports single out Brazil, India
and Philippines for their similar laws that ban patents
on polymorphs (i.e. new forms) and new uses of
known inventions.52 These complaints press countries
to grant patents on a larger range of inventions than
TRIPS requires and thereby limit access to affordable
medicines in each country. In the case of India, the
claim is particularly troublesome because it is the largest
48. See Waxman Report, supra note 16 , at 8 (criticizing patent
extensions which “can work to delay access to low-cost generic
drugs in developing nations”).
49. New Trade Policy for America, available at http://
waysandmeans.house.gov/Media/eNewsLetter/5-11-07/07%20
05%2010%20New%20Trade%20Policy%20Outline.pdf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2010).
50. See 2009 Special 301 Report, supra note 43.
51. TRIPS, supra note 13, at art. 27(1).
52. See 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 17, at 26 (India), 29
(Brazil), 36 (Philippines).
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supplier of generic medicines in the world. The more
patents India grants, the less possibility there will be to
find a source of generic supply for other countries.
7. Vague Definitions of “Counterfeit”
Pharmaceuticals
The 2009 and 2010 reports list concerns about
“counterfeit” pharmaceuticals in several countries. But
it is unclear what definition of “counterfeit” is being
used. Under TRIPS, “counterfeit” has the particular
meaning of a product that willfully deceives consumers
by using an identical mark to the originator.53 It is
not correctly applied to an allegedly unauthorized
generic version of a patented product or to lesser forms
of trademark infringement that do not use identical
marks.
The reports frequently allege concerns with
“unauthorized use of bulk active pharmaceutical
ingredients” by manufacturers in Brazil, China and
India, but fail to identify who determined that these
uses were unauthorized. Civil litigation is the proper
mechanism for enforcing a patent and determining if a
particular use is in fact a violation. Yet, USTR cites no
such litigation and appears to be simply taking industry
complaints as fact.
In all references to “counterfeit” medicines,
USTR should ensure that the U.S. position respects
the legitimacy of generic medicines and clearly
distinguishes generic equivalents from actual trademark
counterfeits. And when it makes accusations about
violations of patent law, such as targeting “unauthorized
uses” of patents, it should support those claims with
proof.
8. Vague Criticisms of Pharmaceutical Patent
Policy
The 2009 and 2010 reports make many vague
allegations that a particular country’s patent law is
“weak” or otherwise deficient, with little indication as
to what is specifically wrong with its system.54
The 2009 report lists the Philippines on the Watch
List and comments, “The United States is troubled
by the amendments to the patent provisions in the
Philippines Intellectual Property Law only as they
apply to pharmaceuticals. The amendment significantly
weakens patent protection for pharmaceutical
53. TRIPS, supra note 13, at art. 51 n. 14.
54. See 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 17, at 24 (Algeria
cited for “weak” patents); 26 (India cited for needing “stronger”
protection). See 2009 Special 301 Report, supra note 23, at 34
(citing “shortcomings in Paraguay’s patent regime”).
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products.” There is no citation to the law or what
part of it USTR opposes. There is no ban in TRIPS
from having patent law requirements that apply
specifically to pharmaceuticals. As the WTO panel
noted in the Canada — Patent Protection decision,55
TRIPS only bans unjustified discrimination by field
of technology, not mere differentiation. And the
Doha Declaration specifically requires countries to
promote access to medicines for all. There is nothing
in the recent amendments to the Philippines patent
law that violates the TRIPS Agreement. The new law
puts in place TRIPS-compliant compulsory licensing
and government use provisions, excludes minor new
uses or new forms of existing medicines from patent
protection, authorizes TRIPS-compliant parallel
importation, and adopts recognized limitations to
patent rights, such as limitations for experimental use.
9. Enforcement Requirements
In many instances in the 2009 and 2010 Reports,
USTR presses countries to adopt TRIPS-plus
intellectual property enforcement procedures that
could limit access to medicines. Particularly troubling
are the many vague complaints about the need to give
border officials (and others) the ability to instigate raids
and confiscate suspected infringing products. These
allegations are not specifically limited to trademark
counterfeit or commercial copyright infringements.
Seizures of legitimate medicines by border officials
have become a massive problem for access to medicines
around the globe, particularly through the so-called
“Dutch seizure” cases in Europe.56 The U.S. should not
be encouraging border officials to confiscate products
that allegedly violate patents. Patent violations cannot
be identified by sight by border officials or police.
The reason we enforce patents through complex civil
proceedings is that such proceedings are necessary to
avoid wrongful confiscations. Wrongful confiscations
of medicines harm more than economies (which itself
threatens social welfare), they directly threaten the lives
55. WTO, Canada — Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114 (Mar. 17, 2000).
56. Since late 2008, customs officials in the Netherlands, Germany
and France have seized at least twenty shipments of legitimate
generic medicines. Of the shipments, nineteen were legally
manufactured and exported from India and intended for developing
countries where they could be legally imported. Patents did not
exist on the medicines in either the country of origin or destination.
These shipments were seized as a result of national implementation
of an EU regulation that empowers border officials to classify and
seize medicines as counterfeits if the customs official determines
(often at the direction of pharmaceutical companies) that the
medicines violate territorial patents of the relevant EU country.
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of people who depend on uninterrupted supplies of the
medicines.57
10. Restrictions on Evidence-Based
Reimbursement Programs
In the 2009 and 2010 reports, the USTR included
sections on “Supporting Pharmaceutical [and Medical
Device] Innovation” that promote only one narrow
pro-innovation policy: convincing other countries to
abandon regulatory and reimbursement programs that
restrain the high cost of patented prescription drugs.
The reports single out all Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) members
and specifically mention Finland, France, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Taiwan, and
Poland for administering “unreasonable . . . reference
pricing or other potentially unfair reimbursement
policies.”58
TRIPS does not restrict how countries regulate the
market power of companies created by patents. Patents
on medicines create particularly strong and socially
harmful market power because people will pay anything
they can for life-savings drugs. There are often no
substitutes if a truly innovative medicine is under
patent, and the burdens of lack of access fall almost
exclusively on the poorest people (or, in the U.S., the
uninsured).
As in other areas, the use of Special 301 to target
reimbursement programs appears linked to a broader
international regulatory agenda. The free trade
agreements negotiated with Australia and Korea under
the Bush Administration included chapters imposing
restrictions on pharmaceutical reimbursement programs.
During and after the negotiation of these agreements,
U.S. state officials repeatedly warned USTR and
Congress that the norms adopted in these agreements,
if applied to U.S. state governments, would cripple
Medicaid programs.59 This is because Medicaid programs
rely on preferred drug lists to exact lower prices from
pharmaceutical companies, which operate very similarly
to the formularies and other programs targeted by the
U.S. in other countries.
The concerns of state officials protesting the use
of Special 301 to criticize reimbursement policies

abroad that are similar to those used by U.S. Medicaid
programs had minimal effect. The 2010 report, as in
2009, continues to target unfair reimbursement policies
without describing what is unfair about them or how
these programs differ from what states now do to
reduce drug prices. There is nothing in the Special 301
statute that authorizes USTR to pressure or sanction
other countries for their pharmaceutical reimbursement
policies.
IV. Conclusion
The continuation of the Special 301 program
to threaten and sanction countries for TRIPS plus
intellectual property and pharmaceutical regulation
policies stands in stark contrast to the principles that
the Obama Administration states that it espouses.
Global health groups have developed the outlines of
a trade and access to medicines agenda that needs to
be expanded into a broader campaign. The first step
should be to expand President Clinton’s Executive
Order 13155 to all developing countries. No
developing country anywhere in the world should be
pressed by the U.S. to adopt an intellectual property
or pharmaceutical regulation policy in excess of those
required by the WTO accords if the effect will be to
raise prices of needed medicines in that country.

57. In the case of AIDS and other illnesses, an interruption in
supply of medicines can lead to drug resistance -- which harms not
only the patient but the greater society effort to combat the disease.
58. 2010 Special 301 Report, supra note 17, at 14; 2009 Special
301 Report, supra note 23, at 7-8.
59. See S.J. Res. 50 (Vt. 2006) (urging USTR to “pursue an
exchange of Interpretive notes” with Australia to formally ensure
state Medicaid programs would not be covered by Annex 2(c)).
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